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DESIRE FOR TEXT:  
BRIDLING THE DIVISIONAL STRATEGY 
OF CONTRACT 
PASQUALE FEMIA* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Nous avons un irrésistible besoin d’un texte qui donne au juge le pouvoir de briser les 
conventions abusives.
1
 
In 1907 the French jurist Georges Ripert, considering the first diffusion of 
standard contracts, regretted the lack of a statute regulating abusive clauses. 
“We have”—he said—“an irresistible need for a text that empowers the judge 
to break abusive contracts.” Un irrésistible besoin: What can he not resist? 
Besoin d’un texte: In which sense does a text become an object of desire? 
Ripert was a conservative thinker: for him, no one but the state should be 
allowed to rewrite the rights of private citizens. According to his classical 
scheme, the protection of the individual and the public monopoly on the 
legislative process support one another: any attempt to reconstruct the 
categories of private law by emphasizing their social function is treated as a 
subversion of the fundamental exclusion (there is nothing beyond the 
individual) that lies at the core of legal science. That is why, twenty-two years 
later, Ripert harshly criticized Louis Josserand’s celebrated work on the social 
function of rights, charging the author with bolshevism.2 
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 1.  Georges Ripert, Examen Doctrinal: Jurisprudence Civile, [N.S. 36 56. Annee] REVUE 
CRITIQUE DE LEGISLATION ET DE JURISPRUDENCE [RCLJ]  193, 202 (1907) (Fr.) (treating the subject 
of “validité et interprétation des clauses de déchéance contenues dans les polices d’assurances”); see 
also Jean-Pascal Chazal, G. Ripert et le déclin du contrat, 2004 REVUE DES CONTRATS [RDC] 244 (Fr.) 
(providing a biographical account of Georges Ripert’s life and work). 
 2.  Georges Ripert, Abus ou relativité des droits—A propos de l’ouvrage de M. Josserand: De 
l’esprit des droits et de leur relativité, 1927, 49 RCLJ 33 (1929) (Fr.) (reviewing LOUIS JOSSERAND, DE 
L’ESPRIT DES DROITS ET DE LEUR RELATIVITE THEORIE DITE DE L’ABUS DES DROITS (Dalloz 1927) 
(Fr.)). Josserand answered that the charge was “manifestement inexacte” (manifestly wrong), ironically 
adding that Ripert had a Bismarckian way of thinking about the law (which Josserand summarized as 
“les droits, c’est la force”).  Louis Josserand, A propos de la relativité des droits: réponse à l’article de M. 
Ripert, 49 RCLJ 277, 280 (1929) (Fr.); see also Christophe Jamin, Le rendez-vous manqué des civilistes 
français avec le réalisme juridique. Un exercice de lecture comparée, 51 DROITS: REVUE FRANÇAISE DE 
THEORIE, DE PHILOSOPHIE ET DE CULTURE JURIDIQUES [DROITS] 137 (2010) (Fr.) (describing 
Ripert’s philosophy of individual rights as a conservative one). The charge of bolshevism is nonsensical, 
considering Josserand’s defense of the freedom of contract. Jean-Pascal Chazal, Louis Josserand et le 
nouvel ordre contractuel, 2003 RDC 325 (Fr.). 
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Ripert’s critique of Josserand was as fierce as his need for a text was 
irresistible.3 The irrésistible besoin d’un texte and the desperate search for a 
trace left by the Legislator are symptoms of lex-addiction. According to positive 
law’s theoretical narrative, only legislative intent can, as an immanent deus ex 
machina, solve any legal question. Thus, Ripert sought to curb abusive 
contracts, but only with the permission of a public text. 
More than a century after Ripert’s revelation, legal science shows the same 
difficulties with treating the contract as a source of power. Desire for public text 
and resistance against complete textualization are two faces of the same 
phenomenon: all legal writings are in statutes, all legal facts are in contracts. 
Statutes count as intangible, and thus sacralized, laws. They are a modern 
rendition of ius sacrum.4 Contracts count as a sacralization of the private 
anomie. Thus, contracts cannot be reduced to their writing not only out of 
respect for the parties’ freedom, but also out of respect for the real event, the 
real modus essendi of the agreement (volenti non fit iniuria is a source of 
anomie). In this scheme, contractual fairness is irrelevant; if it is protected, that 
is only by accident. 
The hermeneutic turn, established in European legal science since the mid-
fifties of the last century, has not really had any significant effect on the inability 
of legal science to ensure contractual fairness. The statement, often repeated, 
that the judges make law, simply hides the issue within the context of creation, a 
zone of indistinction between law and politics. Judging and adjudication remain 
mysterious activities, the result of obscure insights, perhaps nothing but 
representations of a hegemonic sense of order. 
A different approach to the problem of contractual fairness is to study the 
contract as radical writing in a whole intertextual vision of the legal 
phenomenon.5 Under this view, laws and contracts are both parts of a global 
intertext, a set of signs through which they develop every legal communication 
according to the systemic operational criteria. 
This article describes how to study the contract as radical writing, and the 
implications of such study. Part II begins by revealing a contradiction in the 
classical model: on the one hand, it insists on an epistemic divide between 
statutes (writings) and contracts (facts), while on the other hand, it considers 
both as divided unity. Part III explains the proper sense of the construction of 
the contract as radical writing and the power effects behind the classical view. 
Part IV places this discussion in the wider context of the systemic contractual 
functioning, and describes a systemic problem unveiled by studying the contract 
 
 3.  In a letter to Josserand dated April 29, 1929, Ripert admitted that his words had been poorly 
calibrated. Letter from Georges Ripert to Louis Josserand (April 29, 1929), available at 
http://viewer1.cg69.mnesys.fr/accounts/mnesys_cg69/datas/medias/IR_pour_internet/224%20J.pdf (Fr.). 
 4.  Reiner Maria Kiesow, Ius sacrum. Giorgio Agamben und das nackte Recht, 1 
RECHTSGESCHICHTE [RG] 56, 70 (2002) (Ger.) (posing “ius sacrum” as the hidden matrix of modern 
law). 
 5.  See Ino Augsberg, Reading Law: On Law as Textual Phenomenon, 22 LAW & LITERATURE  
369 (2010) (analyzing the legal system as a specific form of textuality). 
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as radical writing. Specifically, the contract compels any social phenomenon to 
shape itself in a fragmented understanding, according to a bare binary logic: the 
divisional strategy. Part V explores an intrinsic systemic effect of the divisional 
strategy: the paranomic functioning. Paranomia characterizes every pathologic 
closure of systemic communication and traces the cognitive limit of the contract. 
Part VI discusses possible remedies for this problem. The method of piercing 
the contractual veil is rejected, because it suffers the contradiction of the 
divided unity. The intertextual understanding of the contracts activates an 
infrasystemic self-subversion. Within these dynamics, the pathologic functioning 
is healed by solving a problem of collision between different sources of 
regulation (public or private) in a heterarchical system. Part VII closely 
investigates the way to deal with the paranomic functioning through a so-called 
microphysics of ruptures: as it is impossible to completely remove the divisional 
strategy, the most suitable level of intervention comes from below, case by case. 
Restoring a safe systemic communication on the contractual text is the aim of a 
renewed conception of fundamental rights as self-subversive forces. 
II 
THE DIVIDED FACTUAL UNITY OF CONTRACT AND POSITIVE LAW 
The great division between public and private reproduces itself within 
private law: textuality of statutes (public government) and substantiality of 
individual transactions (social powers). The public–private divide stands for an 
ontological break between ought (regulation by statute) and is (regulation by 
private ordering). The ought of statutory law counts as “and this ought to be 
how I am” (it is a transcription of a will drawn by a phantom named “the 
Legislator,” an invisible monster who reveals itself only through infinite 
writings); the is of contract law counts as “and this is how it ought to be” (since 
the contract is regarded as a pure phenomenon of freedom, what happens in the 
contractual arena is what has to happen). 
The voice of the public sovereign who sits in parliament is heard through 
writings: before the forms of the parliamentary procedure, before publication, 
laws do not exist. Their being in force presupposes validity, that is, their being 
as an ought comes entirely from a complex network of writings, an intertext: 
they are bare textual facts. Custom is a similar phenomenon: the orality of 
custom (celebrated in common law) is an epistemic device to regulate the 
relationship between power and writing less strictly.6 Customs involve memory 
and collective memory is built on writings. The ought of customs circulates 
among many texts, and so the rulers can enlarge or narrow the promise of equal 
treatment that each norm implies, because the norm is not fixed in a single text 
(as a statute would be), but only affirmed in a textual net (custom). 
 
 6.  DICTIONNAIRE DE LA GLOBALISATION 113 (André-Jean Arnaud ed., 2010) (defining 
coutume) (Fr.). 
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On the contrary, the classical legal imagination conceives of private 
bargaining as a state of social fact. Contract has been considered for a long time 
a reality before and beyond its form; the texture of written clauses is intended 
as a set of signs that corresponds to a pre-textual entity behind it. This 
hypothetical, not yet juridical (prejuridical, properly speaking) ens reale—the 
social, moral, economic mutual consent—counts both as the true object of 
public regulation by statutes, civil codes, and constitutions, and as the real 
matter of legal theory’s discourses. The propositions of legal science, especially 
those subtly constructed in continental legal dogmatics, are affected by the 
rhetoric of presence: the legal discourse searches for the “nature of the 
contract” (as if it were an inquiry into the nature of the things), the true social 
(yet not juridical) interests at stake in the bargaining process, and the proper 
semantics of the living relationship. The space between the words of the 
contract and the (supposedly all-inclusive) reality of the referred human 
interaction is filled up with methodological instruments that would restore the 
contract to the facts.7 
The rhetoric of substance versus presence, which has marked the operations 
of legal theory for a long time, is almost unable to react against unequal 
distributive effects. By comparison, it has plenty of categories to manage the 
social pathologies of exchanges: bona fides, good faith, unconscionability, 
clausula rebus sic stantibus, exceptio doli, promissory estoppel, 
Geschäftsgrundlage, reliance, nullité de protection and so on.8 All these 
categories are reasons to complain about an unfair distributive output, but, 
unfortunately, they clash with the distorted dialectics between public norms and 
private facts. In political discourses norms are intended as mechanisms to cause 
social actions. The validity of norms is above all an imperative for bringing 
about effects. (The ought is “ought to do.”) There is nothing natural in norms; 
they exist to modify the ordinary course of things. Conversely, legal dogmatics 
constructs its propositions by treating norms as entities with which science may 
not interfere. The classical science of norms discloses hidden connections 
between norms and sheds light on obscure normative meanings, but absolutely 
forbids itself to make norms. In accordance with this premise, legal science 
corroborates its propositions about norms by testing their correspondence with 
the semantics of norms (a semantics fixed by science itself). Coherence between 
 
 7.  Regarding natura contractus, see Paolo Grossi, Sulla ‘natura’del contratto, 15 
QUADERNI FIORENTINI PER LA STORIA DEL PENSIERO GIURIDICO MODERNO 593, 598–99 (1986) 
(It.). Wilhelm Scheuerle deconstructs the concept of “essence” in his work, Das Wesen des Wesens. 
Wilhelm A. Scheuerle, Das Wesen des Wesens: Studien über das sogenannte Wesensargument im 
juristischen Begründen, 163 ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS [AcP] 429 (1964) (Ger.). 
 8.  See CLAUS-WILHELM CANARIS, DIE BEDEUTUNG DER JUSTITIA DISTRIBUTIVA IM 
DEUTSCHEN VERTRAGSRECHT (1997) (Ger.); Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its 
Relation to Distributive Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 515 (1992); James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 
CALIF. L. REV. 1587 (1981); Denis Mazeaud, Loyauté, Solidarité, Fraternité: La Nouvelle Devise 
Contractuelle?, in L’AVENIR DU DROIT. MELANGES EN HOMMAGE A FRANÇOIS TERRE, 603 (1999) 
(Fr.); Pietro Perlingieri, Equilibrio normativo e principio di proporzionalità nei contratti, 21 RASSEGNA 
DI DIRITTO CIVILE 334, 348–351 (2001) (It.). 
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the language of dogmatics and of norms is not considered a good result of 
doctrinal therapy, but rather as a successful scientific experiment. Decades of 
linguistic and hermeneutic turns have not changed this epistemic difference 
between the political discourse’s norm-making and legal dogmatics’ norm-
explaining.  (The epistemic difference is nonetheless consistent with the system 
theory because application-oriented norm-making and norm-explaining 
correspond to several social–sectorial systems.) This difference itself, then, 
cannot be questioned, but the scarce awareness of the double-fragmented 
constitution of scientific legal discourse about human facts, on the other hand, 
can be.9 In this pragmatic game, facts and values (is and ought) interrelate in 
two fundamentally contradictory ways: in one sense, facts are the bare matter 
on which a would-be democratic collective power improves its strategies of 
control by norms (here the is–ought divide works as usual); but in another 
sense, facts are both contracts and norms, a complex constituted by legal science 
that conceives them as an ineffable divided unity in which only epistemic 
operations are allowed. Here, indeed, the is–ought divide does not work. The 
sole admitted value is truth; other values can work only in the darkness. 
Neither legal dogmatics nor political discourse can adequately address the 
problem of unfair distribution. Such a science that describes norms and can only 
speak about the self-description of legal order would not be asked for remedies 
against contractual injustice. If one does not like reality, then the need for the 
text of a lacking positive law sharply increases, because the statutes actually in 
force do not meet our social wishes and kindle our anger. But needs, anger, or 
other emotions cannot create norms by themselves. 
Anyway something remains. From a system theory point of view, what is 
fact in a communicative network? Strictly speaking, in a system there are no 
natural facts, but only matrices of communication.10 Contracts, statutes, 
customs, and doctrinal theses are all systemic structures (produced by re-
entries11 from the environment) that activate specific functionings. So, the 
question whether a judge makes law, in counter-majoritarian difficulty, is 
nonsensical. What is mistaken here is the “making:” “making” law is not 
creation ex nihilo, but a systemic operation. Nor is it limited to reproduction, 
because its boundaries are indefinable in an unending process of self-
subversion.12 Observing the constitutive contradiction that is the divided unity 
 
 9.  Emilios Christodoulidis provides a brilliant analysis of law’s power of “homology” and its 
“mechanisms of deadlock” in his article, Strategies of Rupture. Emilios Christodoulidis, Strategies of 
Rupture, 20 LAW & CRITIQUE 3 (2009). 
 10.  The term “fact” is ambiguous. See HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE 
DICHOTOMY AND OTHER ESSAYS, 29–30 (2002). 
 11.  In systems theory, re-entry is a term of art meaning “the re-entrance of the distinction into 
what the distinction has distinguished.” NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 104–105 
(Fatima Kastner et al. eds., Klaus A. Zeigert trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2004) (1993); see Gunther 
Teubner, Self-Subversive Justice: Contingency or Transcendence Formula of Law?, 72 MOD. L. REV. 1, 
3 (2009) (using the term in this manner).  
 12.  Anton Schütz, The Twilight of the Global Polis: On Losing Paradigms, Environing Systems 
and Observing World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 257 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997). 
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of norm–contract (writings–reality) when both of its parts have been reduced to 
bare facts—that is, objects of legal science (textual and social facts)—the source 
of the weakness, the cage in which the legal theory has put itself, finally comes 
into sight. 
Putting contract and norms on the same factual plane deprives legal 
discourses of their pragmatic force to fulfill the regulative functions that every 
system creates according to its specific code. Private transactions that, 
intentionally or not, escape the epistemic structures of existing positive norms 
become, through the operations of the legal interpreters, facts whose 
qualification, whose systemic sense remains uncertain. Although anyone, in the 
shadow of trial, reads the clauses of contracts and the sections and subsections 
of laws in the same way (trying to destroy, under subtle exceptions or 
interpretations, unpleasant slices of text and exalting the useful ones), contracts 
and norms remain the opposed polarities of a divided unity. The supposed non-
textuality of contract, supported by classical methodology, prevents the judge 
from substituting himself for the parties. All remedies in contract law are 
disempowered, because now they must overcome the wall of freedom and 
privity of contract. Therefore in the classical model remedies are conceived as a 
solution to a liberty problem, not a regulation problem. 
This rhetoric results in vain appeals to morality as the social, regulative, 
and—above all—unifying factor. But there is no all-embracing reality; the 
divided unity makes it difficult to control the difference between private and 
public regulation. Reality is simply a hypothesis that we construct observing a 
multiplicity of sectorial systems, each having its own modality to know-and-
modify the environment. Morality is simply a function of one of those specific 
communication systems and (as each systemic product) cannot trespass its 
cognitive limits to become the explanation for a multiplicity of systems. 
Gunther Teubner has rightly observed that the contract “typically breaks down 
into several operations within different contexts: (1) an economic 
transaction . . . (2) a productive act . . . and (3) a legal act that, recursively 
intermeshed with other legal acts in accordance with the intrinsic logic of the 
law, changes the legal situation.”13 In one contract there are not three 
substances within the same personified subject, but an incommensurable 
plurality of discourses. Every appeal to morality increases the mistaken 
construction of material, environmental, metasystemic unity. Outside of the 
moral system (the constellation of free and unending communications about 
good and evil), “morals” is the distorted name of everything else: in law, morals 
count as “fundamental rights of the systemic constitution.” But there is a better 
explanation for the role of morals: Morals should not be understood as reigning 
over fundamental rights, as old natural law theories taught, but, on the contrary, 
should be understood as themselves subject to the systemic autonomy of law, 
which imposes an interpretation that deconstructs (by re-entries) every moral 
 
 13.  Gunther Teubner, In the Blind Spot: The Hybridization of Contract, 8 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES IN L. 51, 52 (2007). 
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(and epistemic, cultural, scientific, health-related and so on) claim on legal 
constitutional fundamental rights. It is pointless to claim anything like a unity of 
human action in the name of morals; rather, according to the societal 
constitutionalism model, legal theory must acknowledge the indefinite sectorial 
self-subversive communication movements that are produced by the specific 
constitution of each system.14 Unity is not a metaphysical substance in which we 
all move and stay; unity is a function of each sectorial system. Systems produce 
unity as a hypothesis to increase the effect of their communicative operations. 
After a good deconstruction, unity is polyphonic. 
The fragmentation of contract concept according to the intrasystemic logic 
of each system reveals just how deeply inadequate the categorization of classical 
contract law is in our complex, hyper-differentiated, and global society. 
Classical contract law cannot solve the regulative question because it thinks in 
terms of metasystemic unity, treating both law and contract as facts: two divided 
incommunicable modalities in a single substance. In the classical legal discourse, 
then, “private” becomes a strategy to escape all needs for justification: 
“private” means deprived, freed from necessity to give reasons. 
III 
CONTRACT AS WRITING 
Another way is possible. The first step is to shift away from the 
categorization of contract as a fact, and to move to a radical normative view of 
contract as a source of norms15 that exist by way of a common textual sphere. 
Kelsen and his school began to frame contract as a bare source of norms by 
constructing the Rechtsgeschäft (“legal transaction,” according to the English 
translation of Pure Theory of Law16) within the celebrated Stufenbau 
(“hierarchical structure”)17 of legal order. Adolf Merkl, in his 1923 work about 
Rechtskraft (“legal force”) maintains that the Rechtsgeschäft (and then the 
contract, too) is part of a gradual hierarchical “system of legal forms,”18 and he 
adds that private or public Rechtsgeschäfte are legal phenomena having no 
peculiar distinctive quality. They represent nothing “but a grade in a hierarchy 
of legal phenomena of the same kind.”19 Merkl criticizes the attempts to 
 
 14.  Gunther Teubner, Fragmented Foundations: Societal Constitutionalism Beyond the Nation 
State, in THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM? 327 (Petra Dobner & Martin Loughlin eds., 2010). 
 15.  LUIGI FERRI, L’AUTONOMIA PRIVATA 5 (1959) (It.); Pascal Ancel, Force obligatoire et 
contenu obligationnel du contrat, 98 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL [RTD CIV.] 771 (1999) 
(Fr.). 
 16.  HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 256 (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1967) 
(1934). 
 17.  Id. at 221. 
 18.  ADOLF MERKL, DIE LEHRE VON DER RECHTSKRAFT, ENTWICKELT AUS RECHTSBEGRIFF 
213 (1923) (Ger.). 
 19.  Id. at 212 n.1. 
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separate the Rechtsgeschäfte from all other elements of the Stufenbau, labeling 
them as “political-oriented exaggerations.”20 
The second step is to think through the identity-in-kind of every semiotic 
element that the legal system describes as a source of norms: writing is the 
constitutive dimension not only of statutes (public legislation) but of contracts, 
too (private legislation). And so the public–private divide loses a large part of 
its sense and has to be totally rethought.21 
“There is nothing before the text”22: where the quiet theoretician imagines 
that there is a contractual (common) will, there is only text. Text is not a simple 
structure to contain a contractual will; text is a quality, not a form, of 
normativity. The joint signature of contractual parties activates a “fabulous 
retroactivity” (Derrida’s rétroactivité fabuleuse)23 that ascribes the contractual 
norms to an invisible common will. “Will” is an element of psychic systems; in 
legal systems the will is writing, it is valid if it is arguable, justiciable, 
accountable in an intertextual process of writing.24 So, even an oral consent 
must inscribe itself in the legal hyperscriptural texture. 
Oral and even implied-in-fact contracts cannot function beside the writing 
network. Even where the “paper deal”25 seemingly dissolves between 
businessmen, these parties still move continuously in a space built by writings. 
Businessmen’s looser modality of referring to the textual network is the direct 
result of their social position (reconstructed as communicative potentialities 
within the legal system). Modalities of text-referring are strategies of regulation. 
When the parties struggle (not only, as always, to conquer a bigger slice of the 
bargaining surplus, but also) over their position after the performance of 
contractual duties (because a bad contract, especially a repeated unlucky series 
of bad contracts, could even destroy the loser’s sense of his own life), then the 
contractual writing works ex ante to orient the party’s eventual interaction: the 
well-ordered written clauses are the “political” constitution of their closed 
relationship, where each party fears the other’s disruptive power. 
When, on the contrary, there is no positional competition between the 
parties—such that there is no lack of status-confidence, no fear of unlucky 
contractual exit—there is no effective ex ante writing. If in this kind of 
relationship the parties document the legal transaction, formality plays a dull 
 
 20.  Id. at 212 n.1 (Merkl is also especially critical of the attempt to distinguish between private and 
public Rechtsgeschäfte). 
 21.  Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism and the Politics of the Common, 21 FINN. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 2, 2–6 (2010). 
 22.  JACQUES DERRIDA, DISSEMINATION 328 (Barbara Johnson transl., Athlone Press 1981). 
 23. JACQUES DERRIDA, OTOBIOGRAPHIES: L’ENSEIGNEMENT DE NIETZSCHE ET LA POLITIQUE 
DU NOM PROPRE 22 (Galilée 1984) (Fr.) (addressing the topic of human rights); see also Marc Amstutz, 
Rechtsgenesis: Ursprungsparadox und supplément, 29 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 
[ZFRSOZ] 125, 140–147 (2008) (Ger.) (addressing the same topic). 
 24.  Jack M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 770–773 (1987). 
 25.  Stewart Macaulay, The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships, 
Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules, 66 MOD. L. REV. 44, 44–45 (2003). 
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role. But the more the relationship becomes a story of conflicts, the more 
writing increases its relevance: legal conflict is a textual function. Within 
businessmen’s markets there is no trustworthy and untextual paradise: the 
realm of relationships, which theorists have analyzed again and again,26 remains 
a modality of a scriptural nomopoietic structure. Trustful and polite 
relationships between businessmen who do not care about the “paper deal” are 
narratives of no positional competition: each man reproduces himself through 
contracting and has no wish for changing patterns of interaction. But outside of 
this non-conflictual imagination lies the reality of contracts-writing that puts 
together fear and dominion. 
Nowadays, the reality that private entities use contracts to create a 
mainstream capitalistic reproduction of society differs totally from the nostalgic 
image of good old merchants writing polite contracts. Contracts work as the 
constitution of private power in the contemporary reproduction of society. No 
strategy of dominion exceeds the contractual cognitive autonomy: private (but 
diffuse and collective) power is constructed, transferred and legitimated solely 
by contracts. The contract becomes the alphabet of power. “We live more and 
more contractually,” wrote Louis Josserand in 193727: the diffusion of the 
contract does not correspond to an increase in freedom, but to a higher 
concentration of power. Ten years before Josserand, Gaston Morin noted that 
the freedom of contract had been replaced by “a dictatorship of owners and 
corporations, imposing a regulation on a multitude of weaker parties.”28 
Legal theory must point out the cognitive limits of the individualistic and 
factual categorization. The continual joining of discrete exchanges produces 
both surface value—the value that every contract exhibits as its specific legal 
value—and “political” surplus: in the difference between the binary fictional 
reconstruction of textual normativity and the virtual diffusion and 
entrenchment of factual power lies the public dimension of contract. Political 
does not mean “metasystemic.” The political surplus of contractual exchange is 
not a value that crosses the legal system (as legally irrelevant) and flows in 
another system capable of conferring sense onto it: politics is not the name of an 
autonomous system, but only a device for allowing contractual power’s effects 
to reenter the legal system,29 such that those power’s effects are conceivable not 
in contract, but through contracts. 
 
 26.  See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the 
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in 
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963). 
 27.  Louis Josserand, Aperçu général des tendances actuelles de la théorie des contrats, 36 REVUE 
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL [RTD CIV.] 1 (1937) (Fr.). 
 28.  GASTON MORIN, LA LOI ET LE CONTRAT: LA DECADENCE DE LEUR SOUVERAINETE 61 
(1927) (Fr.); see also Louis Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 220 (1937) 
(“[T]he great complexes of property and contract which constitute our modern industrial machine, the 
monopolistic associations of capital, labor, and the professions which operate it, exert under the forms 
and sanctions of law enormous powers of determining the substance of economic and social 
arrangement, in large part irrespective of the will of particular individuals.”). 
 29.  This pattern of interaction between politics and other social systems derives, with some 
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IV 
DIVISIONAL STRATEGY 
Because of the cognitive autonomy of contractual discourse, the whole 
spectrum of negotiations develops and increases outside the scope of critical 
awareness. Under the dominant individual categorization, the law thinks of the 
global world of bargaining in single contractual units. Contract as an institution 
(that is, as continuity) is out of place: the tradition of law-regulating-legal-
transaction encounters the real continuity of institutions only one contract at a 
time. Within this pathological fragmentation,30 legal theory cannot grasp the 
condensation of power that every transaction gradually creates. Contract law 
exhibits a strong divisional strategy, splitting and forcing every bargaining 
process, every complex of systemic communicative functions, into an 
autonomous binary pattern of interaction, named “contract.” Although it is true 
that all concepts act themselves by means of a severe separation, of a reduction 
of complexity, in contract law this process—favoring the capitalistic distribution 
of ownership (always escaping to every request for justification)—radicalizes 
itself and sees the contract not only as a natural fact (object of neutral epistemic 
scientific operations), but also as a product, a segment of an unending 
production, and a great engine to yield externalities and escape any distributive 
arguments. 
Bargaining is an institution for producing order through contracts: without 
bargaining, these products would suffer—borrowing the language of the 
European Directive on the sale of goods—from a lack of conformity. A flaw in 
a contract puts it, literally, out of (legal) order. Arthur Allen Leff said forty 
years ago, in Contract as a Thing, that the right approach “is to think about the 
paper-with-words which accompanies the sale of a product as part of that 
product,”31 and then concluded, in a brilliant final passage, that 
the real hope of an exercise like this is necessarily more modest than any total sensory 
transformation. It can aspire at most temporarily to smash the semantic box in which 
our current thinking is locked. The next step, and the harder one, is crafting a better 
cabinet out of materials really available in a real world.
32
 
How do we “smash the semantic box”? An appropriate strategy for such 
rupture is to reenter three concepts: (1) contract language as radical writing, (2) 
bridling of the divisional strategy, and (3) awareness of continuity. 
Continuity is a necessary normative structure. Hermann Heller—arguing 
polemically against Schmittian decisionism—insisted on this point. He imagined 
a double movement: “What appears from the top down as command, judicial 
 
differences, from Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism without Politics?A Rejoinder, 20 SOC. & 
LEG. STUD. 248, 250 (2011) (“[I]t is the internal reconstruction of the external political impulses which 
matters and that is what is decisive for the sustained transformation of a civil constitution.”). 
 30.  Hugh Collins, The Sanctimony of Contract, in LAW, SOCIETY AND ECONOMY: CENTENARY 
ESSAYS FOR THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 1895–1995 63 (Richard 
Rawlings ed., 1997). 
 31.  Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as a Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 155 (1970). 
 32.  Id. at 157. 
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decision or legal transaction (Rechtsgeschäft), appears from the bottom up as 
legal proposition (Rechtssatz). Without normativity, there can be no decision. 
Normality and continuity of behavior come together.”33 Contract, then, 
expresses only a fragment of the bargaining institution; continuity is a more 
proper form of normativity because it expresses the temporality in relationships 
(time is the dimension of contractual power). 
Bargaining is a fundamental ordering function of the legal system. The 
bargaining process shows contractual powers in action: thus, bargaining is the 
framework for legitimating contractual remedies (such as competition law 
remedies). Like all institutions, bargaining (the institution of making contracts) 
makes sense of every action oriented to create and regulate contracts. Making 
sense, of course, is the first stage of critique. 
Contractual discourses deeply shape the individual life, from labor to 
intimacy, so that the hypocritical constitution of contractual liberty sounds, 
indeed, like a freedom to contract or to die. Contractual writings are subject to 
the same social “phenomena of collective addiction,”34 the same “self-
destructive growth-dynamics”35 that systems theory has recently recognized in 
communication as a general matter. A contractual addiction syndrome discloses 
itself when its irresistible attachment to exogenous factors (power, money, 
knowledge: by contract we can exploit any work value) engenders a compulsion 
to grow. The contractual addiction causes an uncontrollable increase of its 
divisional strategy: unemployment, ecological disruption, reduction of work to a 
bare commodity (without roots and future),36 and psychic suffering. All these 
evils remain externalities, unaccountable effects of isolated contracts.37 
Contractual discourses establish a dictatorship that speaks and dominates by 
the language of consent. As Friedrich Kessler said, 
Society, by proclaiming freedom of contract, guarantees that it will not interfere with 
the exercise of power by contract. Freedom of contract enables enterprisers to 
legislate by contract and, what is even more important, to legislate in a substantially 
authoritarian manner without using the appearance of authoritarian forms.
38
 
  
 
 33.  HERMANN HELLER, STAATSLEHRE 265 (Gerhart Niemeyer ed., A.W. Sijthoff 1934) (Ger.). 
 34.  Gunther Teubner, A Constitutional Moment? The Logics of ‘Hitting the Bottom,’ in THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE: THE DARK SIDE OF FUNCTIONAL 
DIFFERENTIATION 3, 7 (Poul F. Kjaer, Gunther Teubner & Alberto Febbrajo eds., 2011). 
 35.  Id. at 4. 
 36.  Emilios Christodoulidis & Ruth Dukes, On the Unity of European Labour Law, in THE 
COHERENCE OF EU LAW 397, 403–13 (Sacha Prechal & Bert van Roermund eds., 2008). 
 37.  Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott provide an example of a typical divisional strategy in their 
article, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract 
Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 555 (2003). 
 38.  Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1943). 
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V 
PARANOMIC FUNCTIONINGS 
How can legal theory manage this juristic form of life? Working within the 
legal system, the contract constitutes a highly specific sectorial instrument of 
power that (1) confuses norm-writing with fictional consensus and (2) develops 
a divisional strategy, which splits a complex multipolar interaction into 
fragmented couples of action. Like all systems, legal contractual communication 
creates relevance by reduction of complexity. But such complexity reduction is 
particularly problematic in the contractual context, because here the language 
of law-application makes each social dissent hard to conceive as a recurring 
legal dispute. The hegemonic forces at work here arouse a pathological 
selection of facts. Legal, formal relevance becomes a strategy for darkness, not 
a simple reduction. 
Remedies start from the detection of pathologies. Paranomic functionings 
are characteristic of these communication pathologies.39 The paranomia 
pathology,40 which is generated by the absolute closure of systemic discourses, 
prevents us from understanding the movements of power, even despite the 
knowledge and observation of valid norms. This is because the cognitive 
operations that are carried out in the name of the validity of those norms are 
simultaneously the instruments of a censorship imposed on the recognition of 
social relations that are being governed: paranomia is a distorting mirror in 
which facts reflect rules and rules reflect facts, deforming each other. 
For those affected by paranomia pathology, every speech—speech is the 
medium through which power41 constructs and justifies its social actions—
exceeds, escapes, and evades the rules and principles that ought to represent it. 
Paranomic systemic functionings cause an epistemic breakage42 and must not be 
confused with the plainer problem of illegality: whereas the problem of 
 
 39.  Pasquale Femia, Against the ‘Pestilential Gods’. Teubner on Human Rights, 40 
RECHTSFILOSOFIE & RECHTSTHEORIE [R&R] 260, 269 (2011). 
 40.  A similar, but nonidentical, concept of paranomia is presented in Stathis Gourgouris, 
Enlightenment and Paranomia, in VIOLENCE, IDENTITY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION 119, 122, 137 
(Hent de Vries & Samuel Weber eds., 1997). According to him, paranomia expresses “law’s intrinsic 
outlaw nature,” id. at 122, and “Paranomos is the one who is simultaneously beside the law and on the 
other side of law,” id. at 137 (italics in original). This definition is closely related to Benjamin’s critique 
of violence. See Walter Benjamin, Critique of violence, in 1 SELECTED WRITINGS (1913-1926) 236 
(Harvard Univ. Press 1996). Gourgouris associates paranomia with law as a whole; my use of 
paranomia differes insofar as it indicates a specific normative function, a pathological structure of 
systemic communication. This concept of paranomia intends to place itself within the system theory.  
 41.  Properly speaking, power is exclusively an intersystemic concept: even within each system we 
may observe and conceive power. Power operates over everything (economic power, symbolic power, 
academic power, et cetera). Outside of the internal discursive logic there is no power, but only a 
subject’s multitude of fragmented discourses, blurring or dazzling, in search of any form. 
 42.  An epistemic breakage is a phenomenon of collective knowledge. In his work Die epistemische 
Analyse des Rechts, Dan Wielsch offers a profound analysis of the epistemic legal questions according 
to systems theory. Dan Wielsch, Die epistemische Analyse des Rechts: Von der ökonomischen zur 
ökologischen Rationalität in der Rechtswissenschaft, 64 JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 67, 72–77 (2009) 
(Ger.).  
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illegality tests the correct application of the binary systemic code legal-versus-
illegal (contract), the problem caused by paranomia calls into question the code 
itself, and its pathological functioning.43 Paranomia does not indicate a true 
social reality hidden beneath its speeches, it is not so simple: there is not 
another legal reality beyond it, because the legal reality is only a product 
provided by the legal system. Contract, as a source of law, is dominated by the 
discourses of paranomia, such that it functions as a process of regulative 
building that constructs its own reality (that is, the modes and codes for a 
specified interaction), using its entire capacity to shape an epistemic order that 
accords with hegemonic strategies. Contract law structures intersystemic power 
(the power that reproduces itself within the system, the power constructed after 
the re-entry of external social power within the legal system) as a set of rules 
and categories for interactions that always reserve for themselves an epistemic 
surplus value. When courts apply these rules to human facts, framing human 
conduct within the qualifying categories of legal dogmatics, hegemonic power 
always gains a plus. This occurs because, when courts apply the legal 
construction of power to human conduct, they compound the desires and 
strategies of multiple participants. Communications from infinite functional 
differentiations (economy, health, environment, et cetera) melt in legal 
propositions (after re-entry into the legal system): the result of discourses’ 
hybridization does not exactly match any projects of the involved individuals 
(even assuming that each individual, each psychic system, is indeed transparent 
to himself). A residue remains, a gap, a difference: legal power takes possession 
of just such a difference, as its surplus epistemic value emerging from 
paranomic regulation. In this way, each “nomic” is paranomic. 
VI 
REMEDIES IN TEXT 
Social critics of the negative distributive effects of the systemic contractual 
regulation have denounced, again and again, the hiatus between the “formal” 
and the “real”: the artificial texture of clauses, on the one hand, and the socio-
economic relationship that no formal theory of classical contract law can even 
grasp in its refined discourses, on the other. The rhetoric of liberty, through 
codes and statutes, allows collective justice to fall into oblivion. Social critics 
have tried to confer a great deal of implied meaning onto contractual clauses: 
“[p]iercing the contractual veil”44 has become the standard. 
The difficulty with the attempt to pierce the veil is that it often leads to a 
naturalistic approach, which frames positive law and contractual facts as a 
divided unity. This approach aims to identify a uniform and complete social 
 
 43.  A correction of code (legal–illegal, right–wrong, efficient–inefficient) is granted by the self-
subversive internal forces that each system contains. In the legal system the relevant self-subversive 
force is (the fight against in)justice. See Teubner, supra note 11, at 1–23. 
 44.  Gunther Teubner, Piercing the Contractual Veil? The Social Responsibility of Contractual 
Networks, in PERSPECTIVES OF CRITICAL CONTRACT LAW 211, 211 (Thomas Wilhelmsson ed., 1993). 
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reality behind the contract, under the pierced veil. But the veil project must fail, 
because society is internally fragmented through a multiplicity of subsystems. 
No causation, no deterministic engine governs the movements of legal solution: 
under the veil, there is nothing. One has not to pierce the veil, but to reshape it 
from an intersystemic point of view. Legal theory must create a new dress, sewn 
all around the surplus epistemic value brought about by the paranomic 
functionings, and by doing so induce the legal system to heal by itself. But how 
can the veil, the paranomic normative artifact, subvert itself? 
The textual turn is another way to bridle the contractual Leviathan. Text is 
no neutral form, but a specific modality of norms. So, it is not a useful idea to 
search anything behind the text, because the writing remains always the modus 
essendi of what lies behind: a system built on textuality may not escape the 
writing. Rather, resisting the temptation to search the secret under the written 
clauses, discloses the normative valuation inherent to the explicit contractual 
language. The chosen linguistic structure is all that really matters; only by 
looking to the text is it possible to reconstruct a decent regulation of 
relationship by integrating both discourses and their dissemination.45 
An interesting device could be, then, to change the focus of social criticism, 
analyzing contracts radically as writing.46 Even if the gap—the epistemic 
fracture between normative representation and factual development of 
contractual power—is irremediable, every legal subject has a resource to bridle 
this confusing regulation under paranomic functionings: the stream of human 
communicative acts functions as a matrix that merges and shapes continuously 
discursive fragments. The closeness of systemic discourses must be compared 
with these diffused, unstructured fragments. Systems are normatively 
(operationally) closed, but cognitively open47: the openness of the text activates 
a categorical dissemination. Text is the structure of self-subversion.48 
 
 45.  See Marc Amstutz et al., Civil Society Constitutionalism: The Power of Contract Law, 14 
INDIANA J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 235, 240–43 (2007) (“Polycontexturalization of the Law of the 
Contract”).  
 46.  The social embeddedness of contract is embeddedness in text. See Ian R. Macneil, Relational 
Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 877 (2000); Ian R. Macneil, The Many 
Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CALIF. L. REV. 691 (1974). Contract is a slice of intertext: textuality counts 
only as fragmented intertextuality. Gunther Teubner, Contracting Worlds: The Many Autonomies of 
Private Law, 9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 399, 403 (2000) (“Contract today can only be an interrelation 
between discourses. Contract is intertextuality.”). 
 47.  LUHMANN, supra note 11, at 106 (“[T]he legal system operates in a normatively closed and, at 
the same time, cognitively open way.”); Niklas Luhmann, Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: 
The Differentiation of the Legal System, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1427 (1992); see Anton Schütz, 
Thinking the Law With and Against Luhmann, Legendre, Agamben, 11 LAW & CRITIQUE 107, 134 
(“[T]he opportunistic formula ‘operationally closed but cognitively open’, has saved autopoiesis . . . .”). 
 48.  This systemic concept of text is also different from the textualist concept of text in the debate 
between textualist and purposivist interpretation, which Pierre Schlag has convincingly criticized. Pierre 
Schlag, Formalism and Realism in Ruins (Mapping the Logics of Collapse), 95 IOWA L. REV. 195, 230–
34 (2009). Marc Amstutz provides a brilliant analysis of “openness of text” both in the sense of Jacques 
Derrida and system theory. Marc Amstutz, The Letter of Law: Legal Reasoning in a Societal 
Perspective, 10 GERMAN L. J. 361, 381 (“A legal reasoning doctrine is thus called for that is able to deal 
with the creation and displacement of differences in the écriture of legal texts.”).  
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The inexorable process of intersystemic self-subversion allows not only the 
policontexturality of different discourses within the contract: this process, this 
ongoing internal becoming of practical legal knowledge, is also a way to 
measure the paranomic gap. When the difference between facts and narrative 
within the contractual nomos irritates so many points (so many subjects) in the 
streaming communication chain, each subject reacts by raising a motive for 
internal renovation of the systemic categories. The paranomic discourse and the 
prediscursive streams of communication clash thoroughly and activate a 
categorical dissemination.49 This semiotic pressure reshapes the boundaries of 
sense50 and initiates self-subversion. The text of the contractual norm—radically 
conceived as a paranomic excess—is rewritten by the adjudication game, 
according to the intertext that results from the infrasystemic subversion. 
So, when the courts impose duties and affirm liabilities they do not 
abusively replace the parties’ positions in bargaining: they simply solve a 
problem of “collision law” between different sources of regulation (private 
ordering by contractual writings and public legitimations by fundamental rights) 
in a heterarchical system.51 Instead of piercing the veil, we must remove a fictive 
semantics of divisional language and restore a safe systemic functioning. A 
function system is safe when its distributive output is observable by anyone (or 
at least anyone who opens communication movements, political moments, and 
democratic controls through and beyond the system of government). 
VII 
MICROPHYSICS OF RUPTURES 
The self-subversive strategy of rupture52 restores a contractual language of 
justice by fighting against paranomic functionings (an epistemic phenomenon 
not to be confused with sham contracts, fraus legi, and so on). The divisional 
strategy grows increasingly hostage to its collective addiction and selects a 
modality of normative existence that reveals paranomic functionings: 
externalities increase, the order of powers at work in the contractual 
relationship flows beneath the written clauses. Detecting paranomies is not a 
hunt to discover a real matter underneath them, a fabulous nature of the 
underlying affair. We need no text ex machina (statutory law) to solve the 
 
 49.  DERRIDA, supra note 22, at 351. The concept of “dissemination” differs from the concept of 
“polysemy,” because “the concept of polysemy . . . belongs within the confines of explanation, within 
the explication or enumeration, in the present, of meaning.” Id. The dissemination is generation of 
meaning. The categorical dissemination is the same productive process during the construction of legal 
thought.  
 50.  Marc Amstutz, Eroding Boundaries: On Financial Crisis and an Evolutionary Concept of 
Regulatory Reform, in THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 34, at 
223. 
 51.  Teubner, supra note 46, at 407–410 (treating the subject of “contract as interdiscursive 
translation”). 
 52.  The “strategic decision . . . whether to play the system or to confront it,” Christodoulidis, supra 
note 9, at 24 (italics removed), is not a way out of the legal system: the answer to the divisional strategy 
of contract is systemic internal self-subversion. 
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puzzle of contract: it would be a categorical mistake to recreate the opportunity 
for contractual injustice under the horizon of whatsoever new statute is to 
come. The legal God that sits in the system speaks no more for us: now he flows 
in the infinite becoming of our legal communication and shines through the 
global intertext. Instead of preaching à la maniere de Georges Ripert for a text 
that comes down from legal heaven53 we must rewrite it alone: the sacred text is 
the result of an unending immanent process of re-entry. The critical legal theory 
elaborates its adequate strategy of rupture by working against the backdrop of 
the divisional strategy of contract. It is all a question of systemic functioning, 
and the systems must operate to protect the fundamental rights of the 
oppressed parties. 
The divisional strategy of contracts cannot be completely removed and is, in 
any event, useful, because it creates irritations with the environment, which, in 
turn, induce an internal response: increasing individual systemic arrangements. 
So a strategy of rupture cannot destroy the contract (or, above all, the 
bargaining process) by trying to delete the divisional strategy. The strategy of 
rupture can only bring back a safe epistemic approach, in two steps: (1) 
conceiving of the contract as a fragment of an institution named “contractation” 
(the bargaining process itself, the practice of legal transactions), (2) applying 
fundamental rights to the institutional fragment, without using a balancing 
method.54 The first step—recognition of contractual fragments—is, of course, 
necessary, because attempting to construct an alternative language and to 
remove altogether the divisional effect of contract would be unrealistic (that is, 
it would be outside of the systemic transcendental categories). But the second 
step is equally essential; applying fundamental rights instead of using a 
balancing method works as “counter-matrix”55 against the “anonymous matrix” 
of the modern higly fragmented societies.56 After all, the alternative balancing 
approach57 would domesticate the self-subversive force of fundamental rights, 
turning those rights into a bare matrix of existing (implicit or explicit) rules. 
Such domestication would create a well-tempered balance of no real 
consequences. This balancing culture would foster a holistic model that aims to 
 
 53.  See Georges Ripert, Le socialisme juridique d’Emmanuel Levy. A propos de : La Vision 
socialiste du Droit, 1926, 48 RCLJ 21, 31 (1928) (Fr.) (describing and decrying legal prayer). 
 54.  See KARL-HEINZ LADEUR, KRITIK DER ABWÄGUNG IN DER GRUNDRECHTSDOGMATIK 58 
(2004) (Ger.); Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Kritik der praktischen Konkordanz, 41 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 
[KJ] 166, 172–176 (2008) (Ger.); Gunther Teubner, Transnational Fundamental Rights: Horizontal 
Effect?, 40 R&R 191 (2011); contra Hugh Collins, The Impact of Human Rights Law on Contract Law 
in Europe, 22 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 425 (2011). 
 55.  Femia, supra note 39, at 272. 
 56.  Gunther Teubner, The Anonymous Matrix: Human Rights Violations by ‘Private’ 
Transnational Actors, 69 MOD. L. REV. 327, 340 (2006) (“If violations of fundamental rights stem from 
the totalising tendencies of partial rationalities, there is no longer any point in seeing the horizontal 
effect of fundamental rights as if the rights of private actors have to be weighed up against each 
other.”). 
 57.  See, e.g., Robert Alexy, Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality, 16 RATIO JURIS 131, 
139 (2003) (founding the rationality of balancing on a “disproportionality rule”). 
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reconstruct the prophecy of restoring a lost unity. Thus, the self-subversive 
force of fundamental rights would be lost with balancing, along with the 
unending work that those rights do to reset the systemic boundaries through 
political moments of ruptures. 
The discursive collision between contractual and non-contractual legal 
writings is infrasystemic and intertextual. The anonymous matrix of other 
systems (for one, economics) tries to corrupt the discursive systemic structures: 
the matrix comes from outside the legal system, but the conflict takes place 
within it, as a clash of private and public legal texts. Fundamental rights modify 
the norms involved through local ruptures of consolidated meanings. They are 
the instruments for diffuse microconflicts, not for global conciliation. Legal 
science can only steer these policontextural conflicts toward a discursive 
equilibrium of ruptures. This sequence of ruptures protect the autonomy of 
each system from the hegemonic attack of the other system’s matrix. 
Law, as every system, is a bundle of unresolved tensions: dissents, real 
contradictions, a disputed plurality of solutions are the ordinary dimensions of 
its communicative operations. Of course, being able to reach a perfect total 
knowledge, whereby one could see the holistic contract in a glorious narrative 
of global peaceful reality, would be felicitous. But that is a totalitarian (not 
simply a total) narrative. Reality is constructed by oppositive, hegemonic and 
counterhegemonic, fragments. 
VIII 
CONCLUSION 
In the semantic cage in which he had locked himself and his science, Ripert 
could only desire the desire for text. He could not bear the stories that his 
colleagues told in their works; he reacted roughly against the attempts to create 
fairness without the high-descending text he had been waiting for in vain. The 
language of his colleagues seemed to him a religious rhetoric, a legally 
sacrilegious abuse of iteration: “Repetition of the same words, intoxication of 
formulas, legal prayer. The lawyer pronounces the sacred verses with which the 
duties are written and creates a new world.”58 The Other’s rhetoric is legal 
prayer, prière juridique: and jurists shall not pray. 
A century of criticism has changed the forms, not the substance of the 
question. The direct application of fundamental rights (Drittwirkung in 
continental language) has been the secularization of legal prayers during the 
second half of the twentieth century. Awareness of the systemic functioning of 
the law shifts the paradigm. 
We do not need a Drittwirkung, but a semantic destitution of paranomic 
functionings and categorical dissemination; no all-embracing revolutions (none 
of us will see a legal sectorial system—legal, not only governmental—collapse 
 
 58.  Ripert, supra note 53, at 31. 
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suddenly in a day), but a diffuse microphysics of ruptures.59 No fixed set of 
remedies exists. Rather, we must choose remedies by taking account of third-
party effect, liability beyond the parties, duties to renegotiate, or the likely 
effect of direct imposition of rules60: each local system selects its favorite 
fragments to frame a functional language, and we can use each of these 
fragments to help us rewrite the contract, thus inducing a microphysical infra-
systemic rupture. However, we must not search for an essentia within any of 
these manifold categories: there are structures, the force is the stream of 
communication, the result is the rewriting. 
Every court’s removal of paranomic contractual clauses in the name of 
fundamental rights is counterhegemonic application61 and induces a re-entry of 
the communication movements about fundamental rights, a new political 
moment. In a fragmented system (fragmented as the world itself), the strategies 
of rupture are fragmented, too. 
 
 
 59.  According to Foucault, the “microphysics of power” is a way to study the diffusion of power. 
MICHEL FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR: NAISSANCE DE LA PRISON 34–35 (Gallimard 1975) (Fr.). 
The microphysics of rupture is a strategy for radical renovation (or self-subversion) from below. 
(“Rupture” is borrowed from Christodoulidis, supra note 9.)  
 60.   See Gunther Teubner, Expertise as Social Institution: Internalising Third Parties into the 
Contract, in IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT: DISCRETE, RELATIONAL AND NETWORK 
CONTRACTS 333 (David Campbell et al. eds., 2003) (providing an illuminating strategy for choosing 
remedies). 
 61.  Femia, supra note 39, at 273. 
